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ABSTRAK
Penggunaan sentimen keagamaan dan politik identitas dalam konteks lokal politik di 
Indonesia semakin meningkat. Padahal, Indonesia bukanlah negara Islam dan juga 
bukan negara sekuler. Meskipun begitu, Indonesia mengakui kehadiran Tuhan di sila 
pertama Pancasila. Pendapat sementara penulis ialah bersama dengan isu korupsi dan 
Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM), isu agama merupakan isu penting untuk suksesnya kampa-
nye politisi. Tiga hal tersebut di atas merupakan poin utama untuk menarik perhatian 
pemilih. Namun, sejak jatuhnya era Presiden Soeharto dan Orde Baru (ORBA), sentimen 
keagamaan tidak pernah digunakan untuk menyerang agama lain sampai di Pemilihan 
Kepala Daerah (Pilkada) DKI Jakarta 2017. Penulis berpendapat bahwa maraknya sen-
timen keagamaan selama Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017 berhasil membelah masyarakat 
Indonesia menjadi dua ideologi: nasionalis dan agama. Pemisahan dua ideologi ini, 
cepat atau lambat akan mampu menciptakan dua praktik berbahaya yang tumbuh di 
masyarakat, yaitu pengistimewaan Islam (Islamic exceptionalism) dan pemerintah 
yang berjalan dengan tangan besi. Indonesia telah berulang kali mengalami segregasi 
antara Islam sebagai ideologi agama dengan ideologi nasionalis dan hasil akhirnya 
fatal seperti pembantaian 1965 dan kerusuhan 1998. Artikel kualitatif ini menjelas-
kan bagaimana Islamic exceptionalism bekerja dan membingkai diri mereka di bawah 
praktik demokrasi di Indonesia dan mengapa ideologi keagamaan meningkat. Artikel 
ini membahas tentang argumen mengapa bangkitnya sentimen keagamaan dan politik 
identitas harus dianggap sebagai ujian kritis bagi sosio-politik Indonesia dan akan 
berperan untuk menentukan kemajuan demokrasi Indonesia. Akankah cara kampa-
nye, mekanisme politik, dan pendekatan yang diterapkan sewaktu Pilkada DKI Jakarta 
2017 menetapkan acuan bagi politik lokal di Indonesia? Sejauh mana segregasi dan 
polarisasi masyarakat pada Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017 akan mempengaruhi pemerintah 
lokal di seluruh Indonesia, terutama bagi daerah yang telah mengalami konflik yang 
dikarenakan etnis dan agama? 
Kata kunci: demokratisasi; otonomi daerah; politik identitas
ABSTRACT
The rise of religious sentiments and identity politics in Indonesia is currently in a criti-
cal phase. Indonesia is neither a Muslim nor a secular country, although it recognizes 
the existence of God in its first state theory principle. Together with corruption and 
human rights, religion is a fundamental issue in politicians’ campaign materials, as 
these topics can be considered key for attracting voters. The fall of President Suharto’s 
New Order should be considered the starting point of the sublime journey of political 
identity, which often implicates religions and ethnicity under the umbrella of demo-
cratic practices. However, after the fall of Suharto and the New Order era, religious 
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sentiments were not used and did not attacks on other religions until the 2017 Jakarta 
election. As Indonesia is a diverse country, its politics should not exploit religious 
or ethnic differences as the basis for voting for certain candidates or turn them into 
campaign tools. The rise of religious sentiment during the 2017 Jakarta election suc-
cessfully split Indonesia into two sides: those with a nationalist ideology and those 
with a religious ideology. It is hypothesized that this separation will sooner or later 
cause two dangerously practices to grow in the society: Islamic exceptionalism and a 
government that rules with an iron fist. This qualitative article examines how Islamic 
exceptionalists have portrayed and framed themselves within Indonesia’s democratic 
practices and why the religious ideology is again on the rise. It explores arguments 
about why increases in religious sentiments and identity politics should be considered 
a critical test for Indonesia’s socio-politics and decisive for the progress of Indonesia’s 
democracy. Interestingly, the results show that in the context of local politics, most 
people are not attracted by and do not vote for candidates who exploit religious senti-
ments during their campaigns. 
Keywords: democratization; local autonomy; political identity
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia has been undergoing democratization for almost two decades, 
namely since the fall of President Soeharto in 1998. The collapse of 
President Soeharto’s New Order was due to several factors, the most 
significant of which were massive corruption, a meltdown of the In-
donesian economy as a result of enormous foreign debt, and an un-
stable security situation that stemmed from human rights violations 
during Soeharto’s three-decade administration (Bertrand 2004; Barron 
& Sharpe 2010; Colombijn & Lindblad 2002; Honna 2003; Crouch 
2010; Wessel 2005). 
Indonesia is an exciting country for studying democratic reform and 
related developments, as it is the most populated country in the world to 
have undergone political change and reform for the past two decades. 
The fall of Soeharto’s New Order was followed by the spread of riots 
and conflict across Indonesia. The country regularly experienced large-
scale disputes and disturbances; Jakarta, Sambas, Sampit, Aceh, Poso, 
Maluku, and West Papua were areas strongly associated with riots that 
often-implicated religion, ethnicity, and race as the roots of violence. 
Indonesia’s democratic transition has not been as smooth as expected 
seeing as Soeharto left some problems behind when he departed his po-
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sition. It has provoked some frictions and factions in influential political 
positions in local and national level, which has triggered instability in 
the socio-political context. In the three years after 1998, Indonesia had 
three sworn-in presidents. Soeharto’s successors (i.e. Presidents Habi-
bie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Soekarnoputri) led short-lived 
governments and proved unable to guarantee public order and security 
across Indonesia, let alone to solve the economic crisis11 (Crouch 2010). 
Indonesia can be considered a young democratic nation with nation-
alist outbursts that can have unpredictable consequences. In 1999, the 
Indonesian government decided to expand the role and responsibilities 
of local government by implementing regional autonomy. In the early 
years, this change resulted in an outbreak of conflict in many parts of 
Indonesia, such as Jakarta, Maluku, Sampit, Poso, and Sambas. Most of 
these conflicts emerged due to religious and ethnic sentiments. 
Indonesia has been implementing many fundamental democratic 
practices since the fall of Soeharto. During this time, human rights 
have improved, multiple direct elections have been held, constitutional 
and legal provisions have allowed the freedom of speech, and press 
freedom has been legally written into the constitution. These practices 
were expected and predicted, as much literature on democracy routinely 
notes that they result from decentralized government and democracy. 
However, at the same time, decentralization and regionalism have also 
raised some important issues to be discussed, namely a politicization of 
ethno-religious and regional-based identities, the spread of regional and 
communal violence, and the evolution of local-level political actors into 
local ‘kings’ (Davidson 2005). These dynamics in regional politics have 
taken place as a result of a decentralized government (Baswedan 2007).
This paper mainly focuses on why regional violence is increasing in 
the post-Soeharto era. The central questions addressed are as follows: 
Does the regionalism of political and administrative power promote 
violence? How far does decentralization affect identity-based violence? 
Why should the rise of religious sentiments and identity politics be 
1 In 1997, many Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia suffered the worst financial 
crisis and affected the national economy. 
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considered a critical test for Indonesia’s socio-politics and decisive for 
the progress of Indonesia’s democracy? Will the approach taken during 
the 2017 Jakarta election set a new measure on local politics in Indo-
nesia? How it will affect the local politics across the country, especially 
in regions that have had experiences with conflicts based on religion 
and ethnicity? 
The article’s first section relates to progress in Indonesia’s demo-
cratic reform, with a focus on the challenges of regionalism in the 
post-Soeharto era. It also examines why religion and ethnicity have 
rapidly escalated as political issues during the implementation of local 
autonomy and decentralization. The second section focuses on the im-
pact of religious and ethnic sentiments on local politics, mainly based 
on post-1998 election results in post-conflict districts (e.g., Poso, Sampit, 
Sambas, Maluku, and North Maluku). The article then discusses the 
approach that both religious groups and leaders and the government 
have taken to this matter. It concludes by exploring challenges and op-
portunities that Indonesia is facing in relation to these issues. 
METHODOLOGY
This article attempts to answer the questions above by using qualitative 
methods to examine the wave of political identity in Indonesia, includ-
ing the role of religious and ethnicity sentiments within the process of 
democratization, local autonomy, and decentralization. It mainly relies 
on primary data collected through interviews, although secondary data 
is also used to support the author’s arguments. The secondary data 
mainly stems from the extensive work of Varshney et al. (2004), who 
identified patterns of collective violence in Indonesia between 1990 and 
2003.This article uses Indonesia as a case study and focuses on regions 
that have experienced large-scale violence since 1998. It observes the ef-
fect of regional autonomy and democracy on an identity-based conflict 
that involves religious sentiments. 
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INDONESI A N DEMOCR ATIC R EFOR M
Indonesia is considered a latecomer to democracy. Delin (2000) and 
Uhlin (1997) argue that Indonesia can be considered as the third wave 
of democratization since it started in the 1980s by Asian countries, on 
the contrary, Effendy (2017) considered Indonesia as the fourth wave 
of democratization. The Philippines underwent a democratic reform 
in 1986, South Korea in 1987, Taiwan in 1987, and Mongolia in 1990 
(Diamond 2010). Indonesian democratic reform began after the fall 
of Soeharto in 1998. In general, people made five demands during 
the 1998 democratic reform: 1) execute constitutional amendments, 
2) eradicate corruption, 3) punish or bring Soeharto and his cronies 
to justice, 4) decentralize, and 5) establish an independent institution 
focused on corruption eradication. 
After the fall of the New Order era, the new administration focused 
on creating a transitional form of government, moving towards com-
petitive elections, and deconcentrating and decentralizing state power. 
However, Antlov (2004), Liddle (2001), Prasetyo (2005), and Hidayat 
(2017) argue that while Indonesia showed confidence at the beginning 
of its democratic practices, the country’s new democracy is still fragile. 
This has resulted in various disputes, mainly at the local level. This 
chapter explores regionalism in the post-Soeharto era and challenges 
related to religion and ethnicity being used as political issues during 
this period.
Regionalism in the Post-Soeharto Era 
Crouch (2010) contends that Indonesia transformed its highly central-
ized structure into one that is highly decentralized rapidly, whereas 
most other countries have decentralized incrementally. Indonesia also 
arguably has the most daring decentralization policy among developing 
countries. However, the country’s sudden change in political structure 
has had side effects that have led to confusion and controversy, which 
have in turn generated resistance inspired by ideological, pragmatic, 
and interest-based considerations (Crouch 2010, 88). 
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Moreover, facts indicate that many incidents of identity-based vio-
lence have occurred in Indonesia since 1998. Different explanations for 
these incidents exist, including that they are a side effect of the local 
autonomy and decentralization implemented by the post-Soeharto gov-
ernment. Some also claim that they have resulted from the prevailing 
sense of fear and insecurity that accompanies this transfer of authority 
and encourages new or established local thugs and militias (Davidson 
2005; Kristiansen 2003; MacDougall 2007). Nordholt (2002) argues on 
different grounds and criticizes the military’s role during the post-1998 
riots. He asserts that the army has interests in maintaining an unstable 
political and security situation in Indonesia and arguably wants to dis-
credit the non-military presidents21 (seeing as Soeharto had a background 
as the army general). 
This unstable situation increases polarization within the society. 
Religion, ethnicity, social class, and race have also been politicized, 
which has sparked riots in many places in Indonesia (including Sambas 
in 1999, Maluku in 1999, Jakarta in 1998, Poso in 1998, and Sampit 
in 2001) and separatist movements in Aceh and Papua. However, it is 
not limited to the reasons mentioned earlier. For example, many fac-
tors contributed to how the conflict in North Maluku spread and why 
related riots occurred. The battle among local elites is the most reliable 
explanation of why the conflict happened. Since the province had just 
been established in 2001, local elites were fighting to obtain power. 
Moreover, the advancement of local autonomy itself had altered local 
political constellations (Davidson 2005). 
Indonesians had three decades of experience with autocratic govern-
ment and were used to the central government holding power exclu-
sively. The sudden change to local autonomy was a complete surprise, 
since the implementation of democratized government was much more 
difficult and complicated. Scepticism about local autonomy’s ideas and 
2 After the fall of the Soeharto who previously was a general of army, Indonesia was led by 
non-military Presidents (i.e. Presidents Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Soekar-
noputri). Nordholt argues that the army has interests in maintaining an unstable political and 
security situation in Indonesia and arguably wants to discredit these non-military presidents 
which aims to bring the greatness back to the army.
177RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS IN LOCAL POLITICS
reform capacities hit a high point in the first two years after its imple-
mentation (Pratikno 2005). 
Moreover, Pratikno (2005) argues that decentralized government is 
the most appropriate political arrangement for Indonesia given that it 
is a genuinely massive country and is incredibly diverse in relation to 
size, religion, ethnicity, and race. Decentralized government offers great 
opportunities for many provinces in Indonesia but it was poorly imple-
mented (Hidayat 2017). Moreover, local autonomy enables political de-
cisions to be made at the local level. As such, the central government 
needs to provide support to improve democratic practices at this level. 
Reaction to Democratization in the Early Years
During its early years of implementation, democratization resulted in 
chaos in many parts of Indonesia. Numerous incidents received im-
mense public attention and somehow incited similar events in many 
other regions. Everything started in 1998, with the anti-Chinese senti-
ment in Jakarta. This hatred of the Indonesian Chinese ethnic group 
spread across Indonesia (e.g., to Medan, Surabaya, and Sambas) until 
at least 1999. In some parts of the country (such as Poso and Maluku), 
the hatred was aimed at Indonesian Christians. To some extent, in 
Maluku and Papua the hatred was associated to oppose the separatist 
movements. 
Varshney et al. (2004) calculated the number of collective violence 
incidents in Indonesia. Their data reveals that the number increased 
mainly between 1997 and 2001, when approximately 10.247 people 
died in over 2.444 incidents. These deaths mainly occurred due to 
religious and ethnic fights, which Varshney et al. (2004) describe as 
ethno-communal violence. 
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Figure 1 
Deaths and Incidents of Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003)
Source: Varshney et al., (2004).
Moreover, of the number of deaths presented in the figure above, nearly 
9.612 Indonesians died due to ethno-communal fights that occurred in 
599 incidents. Half of the victims (5.452 people in 433 incidents) were 
killed in religious fights between Muslims and Christians. Furthermore, 
4.122 people died as a result of ethnic sentiments and hatred, with most 
victims (1.259 people in 32 incidents) killed as a result of violence to-
wards Indonesian Chinese. The fights between Madurese and Dayak/
Malay that occurred in Sambas and Sampit led to 2.764 deaths in a 
total of 70 incidents (see Table 1 below for details). 
Table 1 
Distribution of Ethno-communal Violence (1990-2003)
Deaths % Incidents %
Ethno-communal 9.612 100% 599 100%
Ethnic 4.122 43% 140 23%
Anti-Chinese 1.259 13% 32 5%
Madurese vs Dayak/Malay 2.764 29% 70 12%
Ethnic-others 99 1% 38 6%
Religious (Muslims vs Christians) 5.452 57% 433 72%
Sectarian 38 0% 26 4%
Intra Muslims 38 0% 22 4%
Intra Christians - 3 1%
Source: Varshney et al., (2004).
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Varshney et al. (2004) also analysed the provincial distribution of the 
collective violence that occurred in Indonesia between 1990 and 2003. 
Seven provinces with the highest victims were coming from the prov-
ince that had the ethno-communal violence (i.e., violence resulting 
from religious or ethnicity reasons such as the ones occurred in Ma-
luku, Sambas, Sampit, Poso, and Jakarta). Table 2 below reveals that 
North Maluku had the most victims’ due to ethno-communal violence: 
2.794 deaths in a total of 72 incidents; Maluku is second, with 2.046 
deaths in 332 incidents. These two provinces had to deal with fights 
between Muslims and Christians from 1999 to 2002. West Kalimantan, 
Jakarta, and Central Kalimantan followed these provinces (in that or-
der) with regard to the provincial distribution of the collective violence 
that occurred in Indonesia between 1990 and 2003. 
Table 2 
Provincial Distribution on Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003)
Province Database IIDeaths % Incidents %
North Maluku 2.794 25,0% 72 1,7%
Maluku 2.046 18,3% 332 7,8%
West Kalimantan 1.515 13,6% 78 1,8%
Jakarta 1.322 11,8% 178 4,2%
Central Kalimantan 1.284 11,5% 62 1,5%
Central Sulawesi 669 6,0% 101 2,4%
West Java 256 2,3% 871 20,4%
East Java 254 2,3% 655 15,3%
Central Java 165 1,5% 506 11,9%
South Sulawesi 118 1,1% 223 5,2%
West Nusa Tenggara 109 1,0% 198 4,6%
Riau 100 0,9% 165 3,9%
East Nusa Tenggara 89 0,8% 55 1,3%
Banten 37 0,3% 112 2,6%
Total 14 Provinces 10.758 96,4% 3.608 84,5%
Other 14 Provinces 402 3,6% 662 15,5%
Indonesia 11.160 100,0% 4.270 100,0%
Source: Varshney et al. (2004).
The number of deaths, especially of those that occurred during the 
democratization process and in the early years of decentralization, is 
very surprising. Numerous scholars hoped that the democratization and 
decentralization policy would result in peaceful outcomes for many 
Indonesians, who had been living in fear under an authoritarian and 
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dictatorial regime for 32 years. Jusuf Kalla claimed.32 that many factors 
resulted in the post-1998 conflicts. For example, he asserts that most 
Indonesians are still adapting to democratic practices and that the vio-
lence that occurred in many parts of Indonesia was just a side effect of 
and reaction towards the democratization process. 
R ELIGION A ND ETHNICIT Y AS POLITICA L ISSUES
The riots that involved religion and ethnicity as the roots of violence 
(namely in Sambas in 1999, in Poso in 1998, in Jakarta in 1998, in 
Moluccas in 1999, and in Sampit in 2001; for Europe case see Soeseno 
2012) occurred during the democratic transition period in Indonesia. 
Although these conflicts did not stem from one thing in particular, 
ethnicity and religious sentiments played the most significant role. Lo-
cal politics has somehow shaped religion and ethnicity into political 
issues following decentralization. 
Discussions about religion and ethnicity in the era of decentraliza-
tion are complicated seeing as the Indonesian people are diverse. More-
over, religion can be viewed as a boundary marker of ethnic identity in 
many local contexts in Indonesia, given that many religious and ethnic 
boundaries were crossed during the violent conflicts that occurred in 
Indonesia (mainly after Soeharto’s fall in 1998) (Miichi 2014). However, 
the disputes mainly took place during the beginning of the democrati-
zation process and arguably declined after decentralization was imple-
mented. Furthermore, the practice of democracy, local autonomy, and 
decentralization creates competition for power and patronage among 
political actors. Most political contestation at the local level is based 
on religious affiliations and identities; it only occasionally touches on 
ideas, concepts, and education levels. 
Moreover, Sidel (2006) argues that local constellations of religious 
authority and political economy combined with the 1999 elections, 
decentralization, and redrawing of administrative boundaries (peme-
karan) created uncertainty and anxiety at local levels. Such issues of 
3 Interview with Jusuf Kalla, 9 November 2017.
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ambiguity set the same pattern in the violent conflicts that occurred in 
Poso and Ambon between 1998 and 2001. Collective violence among 
religions involved armed groups attacking neighbourhoods and villages 
populated by believers of an opposing religious faith. 
Miichi (2014) claims that the politicization and mobilization of 
ethnicity have declined since the implementation of decentralization. 
However, he also asserts that soft non-violent conflict has been prevalent 
instead, especially following the implementation of direct elections. He 
also contends that the soft non-violent conflict was due to local-level 
political actors’ tendency to use and exploit adat (local custom) and the 
sentiments of indigenous people. At some point, candidates also used 
religions as their primary symbols. 
It is also interesting to observe that before the 2017 Jakarta guberna-
torial election, candidates in local elections used religious and ethnic 
sentiments against candidates who shared their own beliefs (mostly Is-
lamic). These Muslim candidates self-proclaimed and practiced an ‘I 
am more pious than you’ attitude and never attacked opponents with 
beliefs different from their own. In Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial elec-
tion, the religious and ethnic sentiments were used by the supporters 
of Muslim candidates against a candidate with different beliefs and 
ethnicities. The election had three candidates: two Muslims—Agus 
Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY) and Anies Baswedan (ABW)—and Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok). Even though the two Muslim candidates 
never attacked Ahok personally, the author argues that they never de-
fended Ahok or stood up to their supporters who attacked him based on 
his ethnicity and beliefs. It is difficult to deny that both AHY and ABW 
gained from their supporters’ attacks on Ahok. Indeed, a political survey 
conducted by Lingkaran Survei Indonesia from late October to early 
November 2016 revealed that ABW gained the most from the attacks 
on Ahok’s belief. Aside from the issue of blasphemy (which makes Ahok 
an enemy of a few Muslim communities), plenty of unhealthy attacks 
on Ahok allegedly came from the other two candidates’ supporters. 
Moreover, as noted previously the rise of religious sentiments during 
the 2017 Jakarta election split the nation into two camps: nationalist 
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ideology and religious ideology. It is arguable that this separation will 
sooner or later give rise to two dangerous practices in the society: Is-
lamic exceptionalism and a government that rules with an iron fist. In 
this article, Islamic exceptionalism is defined by author as a privilege 
that is automatically earned by Muslims in a Muslim-majority nation. 
This privilege leads to destruction and disputes if used unwisely. As 
such, the government must manage and oversee the dynamics and 
development of Islamic exceptionalism so that everyone in the society 
can live in peace. Islamic exceptionalism does not occur in a homoge-
neous nation, but it can create trouble in a vast and diverse state such 
as Indonesia. The dispute between nationalist and religious ideologies 
must be handled by developing more space for discussion and creating 
room for people to get to know each other. 
Diagram 1 
Consequences of the Conflict Violence
Source: Yanuarti et al., (2005).
Conflicts due to religion and ethnicity cause plenty of trouble, as the 
below diagram demonstrates. Every conflict creates psychological pres-
sure among the involved parties. In this phase, the conflicting par-
ties (especially the victims among them) feel hopeless, helpless, bitter, 
guilty, and depressed. The second phase is social disruption, which is 
usually characterized by social problems (e.g., increased unemployment 
and refugees, an excessive number of orphans and widows, and social 
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disruptions to daily life). The third phase, material damage and loss, is 
characterized by large-scale destruction of public and private property, 
especially places of worship. 
Local Politics
Hadiz (2004) argues that the politics of money and political violence 
are essential tools for securing political positions at the local level. Most 
political violence after 1998 and during the era of decentralization 
regularly used religious and ethnic and initially began through harass-
ment and violent intimidation. However, although the impact of using 
religious and ethnic sentiments in local politics is terrifying, do such 
sentiments really affect election results at the local level? This section 
focuses on the regions of Poso, Sambas, Sampit, and Maluku, which 
experienced post-1998 disputes that had religion and ethnicity as the 
roots of associated violence. 
Moreover, as the data presented in the previous section explains 
(see figure 1, table 1, and table 2), ethno-communal violence that was 
rooted in religion and ethnicity occurred in certain provinces and re-
gions in Indonesia. This notably included the areas of North Maluku; 
Maluku; Sambas, West Kalimantan; Sampit, Central Kalimantan; and 
Poso, Central Sulawesi. This section discusses the impacts that fights 
over religion and ethnicity have had on local elections and examines 
whether fights over religion influence voters’ decisions during elections. 
This section explores voters’ tendencies in post-conflict regions, spe-
cifically whether they vote based on their religion. The results of post-
1998 legislative elections in Poso, Moluccas, Sampit, and Sambas are 
presented in the tables below. These results indicate the total seats that 
each party won in each election. Long established parties such as the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan – PDIP) and the party of the Functional Groups (Partai 
Golongan Karya – Golkar) were consistent in each election, although, 
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – PPP) did 
not get enough votes consistently. However, the parties established after 
1998 such as the the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional 
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– PAN) and the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
– PKB) were collected unsteady voters. New parties were established 
after the 1999 election, including the Democratic Party (Demokrat); 
the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya - Ger-
indra); the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera - PKS), 
which separated from the Justice Party (PK); the People’s Conscience 
Party (Hati Nurani Rakyat - Hanura); and the National Democracy 
Party (Nasional Demokrat - Nasdem). Numerous other political parties 
participated in elections between 1999 and 2014, but most of them did 
not obtain sufficient votes in the calculation of votes in the national 
level. As such, they are combined in an ‘Others’ column below. 
Table 3 
The Result of Local Elections in Poso from 2004-2014 
1999 2004 2009 2014
PDI-P 5 2 2 3
Golkar 19 4 4 5
PKB - - - -
PPP 5 1 1 1
PAN - 1 1 2
Demokrat - 8 8 8
Gerindra - 1 1 4
PKS - 2 1 2
Hanura - 1 1 2
Nasdem - - - 2
PDS - 3 3 -
United Faction 7 - - -
ABRI Faction 4 - - -
Others - 7 8 1
Source: Author’s compilation. Total seats are 30.
Table 4 
The Result of Local Elections in Maluku from 2004- 2014 
1999 2004 2009 2014
PDI-P 10 8 7
Golkar 11 8 6
PKB - 1 3
PPP 4 2 1
PAN 2 2 1
Demokrat 3 7 6
Gerindra - - 1 5
PKS 5 6 6
Hanura - - 3 4
Nasdem - - - 4
Others 10 7 2
Source: Author’s compilation. Total seats are 45. Limited 
data available on the election in 1999.
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Table 5 
The Result of Local Elections in North Maluku
1999 2009 2014
PDI-P - 5 7
Golkar - 10 8
PKB - - 1
PPP - 2 1
PAN - 4 3
Demokrat - 5 3
Gerindra - 1 3
PKS - 4 5
Hanura - 2 4
Nasdem - - 5
Others - 12 5
Source: Author’s compilation. In 1999, North Maluku was part of Maluku. 
The new province of North Maluku was established in 2001. Limited data are 
available on the election in 2004. From 2004- 2014, total seats are 45.
Table 6 
The Result of Local Elections in Sambas
2009 2014
PDI-P 6 6
Golkar 9 7
PKB - -
PPP 2 4
PAN 4 6
Demokrat 4 4
Gerindra 1 5
PKS 3 4
Hanura 4 3
Nasdem - 4
Others 12 2
Source: KPU. From election in 2009 and 2014. Limited data are available 
on the election in 1999 and 2004. The total seats are 45. 
Table 7 
The Result of Local Elections in Sampit
2009 2014
PDI-P 8 8
Golkar 7 6
PKB 3 3
PPP - 3
PAN 3 3
Demokrat 5 6
Gerindra 4 5
PKS - 1
Hanura - 2
Nasdem 4 3
Source: KPU. From election in 2009 and 2014. Limited data are available 
on the election in 1999 and 2004. The total seats are 35. 
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The above tables illustrate the local politics situation in districts that 
had conflicts with religion and ethnicity as the roots of their violence. 
Even though these conflicts were based on beliefs and ethnicity, lo-
cal voters did not trust representatives from parties with a religious 
background. Among the above-mentioned parties, PPP, PKB, and PKS 
reflect predominantly Islamic values, while PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat, 
Gerindra, Hanura, PAN, and Nasdem lean more towards nationalist 
values. However, it is interesting that Prosperous Peace Party (Partai 
Damai Sejahtera - PDS) voters were consistent between 2004 and 2014. 
This party is known for their Christian-democratic values. 
The same phenomenon occurred in relation to the leadership of 
each region. Poso, Maluku, North Maluku, Sampit, and Sambas have 
all had at least three terms of leadership since the conflicts. Poso has 
had two leaders from Golkar and one from Demokrat. In Maluku, both 
Golkar and PDI-P have had the governorship. In North Maluku, the 
head of Demokrat led the province for 10 years and the current gover-
nor is from PKS. In Sambas, a non-partisan leader headed the district 
for 10 years. Sampit was led by a retired army general, followed by a 
non-partisan leader who headed the district from 2000 to 2010. 
Reaction Towards Religious Sentiments
Since Indonesia’s independence in 1945, most Indonesians (including 
the country’s founding fathers) have fallen into one of two main ideolo-
gies: nationalist or religious (Feith 1962; Feith & Castles 2007; Hosen 
2005; Elson 2009).43 However, the ideological differences between reli-
gious Islamists and nationalists have recently become blurred. It is argu-
ably correct to assume that both the nationalist and religious ideologies 
have the chance to manage their ideology, as long as each side recog-
nizes the legitimacy of the other within the umbrella of democracy. In 
4 Please see the Indonesian political thinking 1945-1965 and the decline of constitutional de-
mocracy in Indonesia. There was also a plenty of discussion on the debate on Jakarta Charter 
1945 controversy which resulted seven words were removed. These seven words translated to 
English as ‘with the obligation for adherents of Islam to follow syari’ah or Islamic law. This 
removal of syari’ah from Indonesian constitution become the basis action for many Islamic 
groups and Islamic ideology in Indonesia to modify the national constitution. 
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democratic practices, an opportunity exists to promote prospects for 
reconciliation between these two conflicting sides. 
The first principle in Indonesia’s constitution is known as Pancasila, 
which asserts that believes in one and only one god. This principle 
recognizes that Indonesians are religious; however, it also clearly states 
that Indonesia is not a country based on a particular religion. All Indo-
nesians can practice their beliefs freely and guaranteed by the consti-
tution. However, Indonesia is also a Muslim-majority nation; indeed, 
it is the largest democratic Muslim country in the world. Being in the 
majority somehow places Indonesian Muslims in a favourable position 
within the country, especially in terms of political opportunities. 
Moreover, the government manages the progress of democratization 
by ensuring freedom of the press and regulating freedom of speech 
under a law on electronic information and transaction that is known 
as Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik (UU ITE) or 
Law No. 11 of 2008. This law specifically mentions the regulation of 
freedom of speech, with the exception of hate speech, slander, defama-
tion, and blasphemy. In particular, it explicitly forbids any form of hate 
speech regarding ethnicity, religion, race, or intergroup relations (Suku 
Agama Ras Antar golongan – SARA) (Fadhli 2015). The government 
also established Law No. 40 of 2008, which manages the abolishment 
of racial and ethnic discrimination. 
These two regulations have been criticized for having double stan-
dards that allow them to be used against anyone, especially those who 
continuously critique the government. Some articles in these laws are 
considered draconian, as they can even be used against people who 
have done no harm and just aim to voice their concern over certain is-
sues. For example, a worker told a story about how he was being treated 
by his company on social media (including Facebook); after the post 
went viral, the company sued the worker under the UU ITE. Cases 
have also resulted from the misuse of certain articles of the UU ITE. 
For example, Fadli Rahim, a civil servant from Gowa, was sentenced 
eight months in prison for ostensibly insulting the Regent of Gowa in 
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a post to a group in the Line application;54 however, his post was just a 
critique of the government. The Rahim case was preceded by the Prita 
Mulyasari case. Mulyasari wrote a private email about service at the 
Omni Hospital that noted she was being misdiagnosed and mistreated. 
Her complaint went viral, and she was eventually jailed following a 
civil defamation suit (Dhani 2016). It may be correct to argue that the 
two regulations are suppressing freedom of speech in the society and 
have plenty of loopholes that can be used to attack anyone: ‘Once the 
government is in possession of a hammer, it will treat everything as if 
it were a nail’ (The Jakarta Post 2017). 
Moreover, one issue that should be of concern is that local autonomy 
results in the central and local governments not seeing eye to eye with 
each other. Both parties have their own interpretations of the laws and 
the regulations, which often leads to ambiguity at the grassroots level. 
Regulations and decisions by the central government can lead to violent 
conflict to some extent, due to local elites fighting to obtain influen-
tial political positions in society. An example is the creation of a new 
province in Maluku. North Maluku and Maluku were originally one 
province, but in 1999 then-President Habibie wanted to create a new 
province to separate Maluku’s two main groups of islands (Pieris 2004). 
The northern islands became the new province of North Maluku, while 
the southern islands remained the Maluku province. The creation of 
the new northern province caused local elites to fight over the capital 
and several influential positions at provincial and district levels. These 
local elites’ ambitions for key administrative posts resulted in the use 
of religious and ethnic sentiments and thus made violent conflicts un-
avoidable. 
CH A LLENGES A ND OPPORTUNITIES
The challenges related to preventing a wave of religious sentiments 
in local politics are complicated. Ever since local autonomy has been 
implemented, religious and ethnic sentiments have been inevitable in 
5 Line is a freeware application for communication.
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local politics. Indonesians, especially at the provincial level, have had 
high expectations that local autonomy will actively contribute to solving 
local issues. Indeed, they once considered local autonomy as a means 
to help their regions prosper—especially those regions with promising 
natural resources. 
However, the implementation of local autonomy has been accompa-
nied by some challenges. The main problem of local autonomy is that 
it creates an opportunity for new local ‘kings’ to be established within 
a region. Moreover, decentralization and local autonomy have provided 
more political space for local people to participate. Local leaders tend 
to be corrupt, and statistics show that the practice of money politics 
is increasing (Pratikno 2005). Scholars of democracy often use three 
elements when they evaluate democracy: openness, fairness, and com-
petitiveness (Mietzner & Aspinall 2010; Diamond & Morlino 2005). 
Moreover, Mietzner and Aspinall (2010) argue that political participa-
tion remains low at local levels in Indonesia because many transactions 
related to money politics still occur and candidates manipulate voters’ 
religious and ethnic loyalties during elections. 
Furthermore, Indonesia requires decentralization to cede authority 
to regional governments in all fields except foreign policy, defence, se-
curity, monetary policy, the legal system, and religious affairs (Aspinall 
& Fealy 2003, 3). Moreover, this exception of power leaving out pro-
vincial leaders’ authority in strategic policy because their power will be 
prosecuted by mayors and regents at their levels. At the provincial level, 
leaders’ roles will be to mediate disputes between districts and represent 
the central government locally. As such, local autonomy focuses on 
district and municipality levels rather than on provincial government 
(Rasyid 2003).
Furthermore, to gain voters local leaders will use all instruments 
present in local autonomy and decentralization, including money poli-
tics and political identity in local politics (which contains religious, 
ethnic, and racial sentiments). It has been almost two decades since 
local autonomy and decentralization were first implemented in Indo-
190 JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 3, NO. 2, FEBRUARI 2018
nesia. What have we been learned so far? Moreover, how influential is 
Jakarta on local politics in Indonesia? 
Facts show that in the past seven years, Jakarta has still played an 
essential role in politics in Indonesia. Jakarta has been the miniature 
and an example of how local politics operate. The practice of decen-
tralization is still examined on the basis of Jakarta’s perspective. Rasyid 
(2003) argues that the weakness of local autonomy is that it lacks neutral 
mediation to provide an independent judgment of the quality of local 
regulations. 
Moreover, local autonomy increases the costs of politics. As a result, 
political actors will do anything to get into power. This involves using 
any instruments they have, including religious sentiments. Indonesians 
are still primarily driven by their religious, ethnic, social, and regional 
affiliations (Jones 2010; King 2003; Baswedan 2007).
CONCLUSION
Indonesia started its democratic reform after Soeharto’s fall in 1998, and 
new democratic practices were followed by the implementation of local 
autonomy and decentralization. The democratic practices focus on a 
transitional reform of government, route competitive elections and, the 
expansion of local government powers related to political decisions and 
financial ability. However, since Indonesians live in a vast diversity, local 
autonomy and decentralization have numerous challenges and direct 
impacts. One such challenge is the struggle over crucial political posi-
tions, which results in an accelerated use of political identity in local 
politics—including religious and ethnic sentiments.
Local autonomy and decentralization create opportunities, but at 
the same time they also create anxiety. This anxiety and the above-
described power struggles have together resulted in collective violence 
involving ethno-communal fights between religion communities in 
which armed groups have attacked neighbourhoods and destroyed vil-
lages populated by believers of another religious faith.
Indonesia experienced violent conflicts after the fall of Soeharto, 
namely in Jakarta and Poso in 1998, Moluccas and Sambas in 1999, 
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and Sampit in 2001. Even though these conflicts did not have a single 
element as the roots of their violence, religious and ethnic sentiments 
played the most significant role. Candidates previously used religious 
sentiments to attack candidates with the same beliefs. Unfortunately, 
in Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election they were instead used against 
someone who a different belief and ethnicity. The polarization of In-
donesia’s society—mainly its majority and minority populations—can 
thus not be avoided. This polarization creates problems in society, in-
cluding psychological pressure, social disruption, material damage and 
loss, and victims from the violent conflicts which occurred as a result 
of polarization. 
The results of using religious sentiments in national and local poli-
tics have been immense after Soeharto’s fall. A total of 9,612 deaths 
have resulted from ethno-communal fights that occurred over 599 in-
cidents (as explained earlier in table 1). Moreover, each presidential 
election after 1998 has involved religious sentiments. Nonetheless, this 
article determined that the high levels of religious sentiments used 
during elections did not affect voters. Since 1998, political parties that 
have religious values as their core principles have not won an election. 
Indonesians instead tend to choose nationalist or close to religious-
nationalist parties. Moreover, voters in districts that have experienced 
violent conflicts due to religious and ethnic sentiments (e.g., Poso, 
Maluku, North Maluku, Sambas, and Sampit) have not elected either 
religious parties or religious leaders. 
One of the primary critiques of decentralization is that the central 
government only provides a false autonomy to each province. This is 
because in practice, Jakarta as the central government can abolish local 
regulations. This authority is such a false hope to the local autonomy 
since the local leaders in the local levels cannot maturely decide what 
to do in their regions. The decentralization in Indonesia is required to 
cede authority to regional governments in all fields apart from foreign 
policy, defence, security, monetary policy, the legal system, and reli-
gious affairs. 
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